BYU Law Review
Volume 2010 | Issue 4

Article 7

11-1-2010

Unraveling Lawrence's Concerns About Legislated
Morality: The Constitutionality of Laws
Criminalizing the Sale of Obscene Devices
Nathan R. Curtis

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Nathan R. Curtis, Unraveling Lawrence's Concerns About Legislated Morality: The Constitutionality of Laws Criminalizing the Sale of
Obscene Devices, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1369 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2010/iss4/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

DO NOT DELETE

12/20/2010 1:02:10 PM

Unraveling Lawrence’s Concerns About Legislated
Morality: The Constitutionality of Laws Criminalizing
the Sale of Obscene Devices
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................ 1369
II. CONTEXT & BACKGROUND: LAWRENCE V. TEXAS ............ 1371
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT .......................................................... 1374
A. Alabama and Williams v. Morgan.................................. 1375
B. Texas and Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle ................. 1378
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEX TOY STATUTES ............ 1380
A. Level of Scrutiny for the Right to Sexual Privacy at
Issue ............................................................................. 1381
1. The absence of a Glucksberg analysis in Lawrence ..... 1381
2. The right to sexual privacy is only a rational basis
right ......................................................................... 1383
B. Public Morality as a Rational Basis ................................ 1386
1. History of morals legislation ..................................... 1387
2. Distinguishing Lawrence ........................................... 1390
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................... 1397

I. INTRODUCTION
In a decision feared by some as “the end of all morals
legislation,”1 the majority in Lawrence v. Texas held that “the fact
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding
a law prohibiting the practice.”2 Since deciding Lawrence, the
Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to opine definitively
whether a law passed exclusively on moral grounds can pass the

1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 577 (majority opinion) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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rational basis test—that is, whether public morality in itself is a
legitimate governmental interest.3 Instead, the battle has played out
in circuit, district, and state courts across the country. While some
courts have held—fulfilling Justice Scalia’s doomsday prophecy—that
public morality is an insufficient reason for a legislature to pass a law,
others have narrowed the Lawrence holding and effectively revived
morals legislation from imminent death.4
The first post-Lawrence “morals legislation” to create a genuine
circuit split that could potentially reach the High Court relates to
“device[s] designed or marketed as useful primarily for the
stimulation of human genital organs”5—in essence, sex toys. With no
pretext other than protecting public morality, legislatures in at least
eight states have passed laws prohibiting the commercial sale and
distribution of sex toys.6 Although these laws might be
“uncommonly silly,”7 the question remains whether these
legislatures, citing only public morality, have a rational basis for
passing such legislation.
The two circuits to have addressed these laws are split as to their
constitutionality.8 The first circuit to visit the issue—the Eleventh

3. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (holding that a
statute is constitutional under rational basis scrutiny so long as “there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification” made in the
statute); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (distinguishing for the
first time between rational basis and strict scrutiny).
4. For lower court cases questioning the validity of specific morals legislation, see
Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005) (invalidating as unconstitutional a law
criminalizing fornication between unmarried persons), and In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 148
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (“Basing legislation on moral disapproval of same-sex couples may
be questionable in light of Lawrence.”). For cases upholding morals legislation in light of
Lawrence, see State v. Jenkins, No. C-040111, 2004 WL 3015091 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
(upholding an obscenity law as not violating substantive due process of adult video store
owner) and Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., No. CV 1999-9881, 2004 WL
3154530, at *12 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (“[S]tatutes rationally related to furthering the
legislatively determined ‘public morality’ are constitutional.”).
5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (2010).
6. For a list of descriptions of statutes criminalizing the commercial sale and
distribution of adult toys, see Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 740–41 (5th
Cir. 2008).
7. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that his duty was to
decide cases in line with the Constitution, even though he felt that the law at issue was
“uncommonly silly”) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart,
J., dissenting)).
8. Compare Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 740–41 (striking down a law prohibiting
the sale of sex toys as unconstitutional in light of Lawrence v. Texas), with Williams v. Morgan
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Circuit—distinguished Lawrence and upheld an Alabama statute
criminalizing the sale of adult toys.9 The Fifth Circuit, only one year
later, disagreed and interpreted Lawrence broadly to strike down a
Texas sex toy statute.10
This Comment agrees with the Eleventh Circuit and argues for
the constitutionality of morals legislation criminalizing the
commercial distribution of adult toys, thus avoiding the bleak world
envisioned by Justice Scalia in which there is constitutional
protection for “fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality,
and obscenity.”11 A law banning the sale of sex toys is constitutional
under the Due Process Clause because it does not implicate a
fundamental right and because bare public morality12 in itself remains
in some instances a legitimate government interest. This Comment
will begin in Part II by detailing the relevant portions of the
Lawrence decision and its implications for morals legislation. Part III
will look at the circuit split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
regarding the constitutionality of sex toy laws in light of Lawrence.
Part IV will then analyze the constitutionality of the statutes at issue,
concluding that laws banning the sale of sex toys are constitutional
because (1) they do not implicate a fundamental right and (2) they
serve the legitimate government interest of promoting public
morality under the rational basis test. Part V will briefly conclude.
II. CONTEXT & BACKGROUND: LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
The facts of Lawrence are not complicated, but what could have
been a simple holding invalidating a law criminalizing homosexual
sodomy on any number of grounds has instead potentially triggered
a new era of morality-free lawmaking. In Lawrence, after being

(Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding a law prohibiting the sale of
sex toys as constitutional).
9. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1318.
10. Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 740.
11. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. When this Comment speaks about bare public morality, it is referring to what other
authors have referred to as “religious morality.” Although I disagree with the idea that all
morality stems from religion (and the idea that moral legislation is unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause as suggested by one author), when I speak about bare public morality I
am referring to that which is done based solely on the reigning majority opinion—not any sort
of “universal” morality. See generally Justin P. Nichols, Comment, The Hidden Dichotomy in
the Law of Morality, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 591 (2009); Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation
and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REV. 159 (2003).
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dispatched to a private residence to investigate a possible weapons
disturbance, police officers observed two men engaged in a
prohibited sexual act.13 The men were prosecuted under a Texas
statute criminalizing “any contact between any part of the genitals of
one [man] and the mouth or anus of another.”14 After being
convicted and having their convictions upheld by a Texas appeals
court,15 the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that
the Texas statute criminalizing only homosexual sodomy was
unconstitutional under both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.16
A number of years earlier, the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick had
reviewed a similar Georgia statute criminalizing all sodomy, both
homosexual and heterosexual.17 In holding that public morality was a
sufficient basis for the Georgia legislature to enact such a law, the
Court reasoned, “The law . . . is constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to
be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts would be
very busy indeed.”18
The Lawrence decision took little time in explicitly overruling
Bowers. Justice Kennedy began the majority opinion by recognizing
that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom
of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”19 The
Court held that the intimate conduct protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment included that which was criminalized by the Texas
sodomy statute.20 In overruling Bowers, the Court adopted the
language of Justice Stevens’s Bowers dissent: “[T]he fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice . . . .”21
In an attempt to rely on the Bowers precedent, the state of Texas
offered public morality as its sole justification for the statute.22
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–63.
Id. at 563 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01(1), -06(a) (West 2003)).
Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 362 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 196.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 578 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
Id.
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However, because the Court overruled Bowers—making Bowers no
longer controlling precedent—the State’s argument was defeated
and the law was struck down. Accordingly, the Court concluded that
“[t]he Texas statute further[ed] no legitimate state interest which
[could] justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.”23 Many commentators have taken this statement to
imply that public morality is never a legitimate state interest and thus
will never satisfy the rational basis test.24
The Court appears, though, to have qualified its holding. In a
possible attempt to dispel doomsday fears, Justice Kennedy
explained:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship
that homosexual persons seek to enter.25

This opinion was met with an aggressive dissent by Justice
Scalia.26 Justice Scalia began by emphasizing that most of the
majority opinion has no relevance to its actual holding that the Texas
statute furthers no legitimate state interest that can justify its
application to the petitioners under rational basis review.27 One of
23. Id.
24. See Sonu Bedi, Repudiating Morals Legislation: Rendering the Constitutional Right
to Privacy Obsolete, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 447 (2005); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based
Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233,
1235 (2004) (recognizing that instead of eliminating morality from lawmaking, “Lawrence
reflected the Court’s long-standing jurisprudential discomfort with explicit morals-based
rationales for lawmaking”); Mitchell F. Park, Comment, Defining One’s Own Concept of
Existence and the Meaning of the Universe: The Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas,
2006 BYU L. REV. 837. For scholarship espousing the view that Lawrence did not “sound the
death knell for most forms of ‘morals legislation,’” see John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional
Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (2009) and Gregory Kalscheur, S.J., Moral Limits
on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious
Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7 (2006) (“[E]xplicit reliance on moral rationales for
law should not be banished altogether from the realm of legitimate government interests.”).
25. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
26. Id. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice O’Connor concurred in
the judgment but felt instead that the statute ought to be invalidated based on the Equal
Protection Clause and not the Due Process Clause. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
This, in my opinion, would have been a much less controversial means of striking down this
statute.
27. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia’s primary criticisms was the majority’s failure to
establish whether the right at issue was a fundamental right.28 Justice
Scalia concluded that, even though not specifically stated by the
majority, the right to certain sexual intimacy was not a fundamental
right—and essentially, without specifically stating, the majority
applied the rational basis test.29 In expressing his disapproval of such
a quick overruling of Bowers, Justice Scalia argued that certain laws,
like those against “bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, . . . bestiality, and obscenity,” are only constitutional if
morals legislation remains valid.30 To Justice Scalia, this ruling
represented “a massive disruption of the current social order.”31 It is
in light of this decision, and the potential for this disruption, that
courts have become split on the constitutionality of legislation passed
only on the grounds of public morality, or “morals legislation.”
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Laws prohibiting the sale of—but not the use of—sex toys have
been passed in at least eight states.32 A number of state courts have
addressed the constitutionality of the statutes, and these courts are
split as to their constitutionality.33 Some of these states, however,
addressed these laws before Lawrence was decided. Post-Lawrence,
two circuits have addressed two substantively identical laws (one
from Alabama and the other from Texas) and have come out on
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 590.
31. Id. at 591.
32. The states include: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Texas, and Virginia. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir.
2008).
33. The states with sex toy statutes currently in force are Alabama, Mississippi, and
Virginia. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (2010); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-373 (2009). The highest courts of both Alabama and Mississippi have
upheld their respective state statutes against constitutional challenges. 1568 Montgomery
Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 2009 WL 2903458 (Ala. 2009); PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So.
2d 1244 (Miss. 2004). The Virginia Supreme Court has not yet had a chance to review its
state’s statute. Louisiana, Kansas, and Colorado have all enacted similar obscene-devices
statutes, but their respective state supreme courts struck them down as being unconstitutional.
State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64 (La. 2004); State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1990);
People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985).
Georgia also passed a similar statute, but it was struck down by the Eleventh Circuit because it
infringed free speech rights. This That & The Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County,
439 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2006).
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opposite ends of the spectrum. This Comment will now consider
these two circuit cases.
A. Alabama and Williams v. Morgan
In 1998, Alabama began criminalizing the sale and distribution
of certain sexual and obscene devices. Specifically, the Alabama code
prohibits the distribution of “any device designed or marketed as
useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.”34 The
statute exempts sales of devices “for a bona fide medical, scientific,
educational, legislative, judicial, or law enforcement purpose.”35 The
statute does not, however, prohibit the possession, use, or gratuitous
distribution of these kinds of obscene devices.36 Six plaintiffs—both
as sellers and users of sexual devices—brought an action seeking to
enjoin the Attorney General of the State of Alabama from enforcing
the statute.37 The plaintiffs argued that the statute infringed upon
their “fundamental right to privacy and personal autonomy” under
the Fourteenth Amendment.38
This case has an extensive procedural history. Following a bench
trial, the district court held that there was no fundamental right to
use sexual devices established in the Constitution.39 The court then
proceeded to scrutinize the statute under rational basis review. The
court enjoined enforcement of the statute, concluding that the
statute lacked any rational basis—public morality being the only basis
having been promoted.40 On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit in 2001,
which was prior to the Lawrence decision, the court reversed the
district court’s conclusion that the statute lacked a rational basis and
held that the promotion and preservation of public morality
provided a rational basis.41 However, the action was remanded to the
district court to determine if the plaintiff’s as-applied fundamentalrights challenge had merit.42

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (2010).
Id. § 13A-12-200.4.
Id. § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1).
Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1293.
Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944, 952 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 955.
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On remand, the district court again struck down the statute,
finding that it failed strict scrutiny.43 The court held that the
Constitution established a fundamental right to sexual privacy—one
which was deeply rooted in the history and traditions of our nation.44
Furthermore, the district court found that the right to sexual privacy
does in fact “encompass a right to use sexual devices” like those
marketed by the plaintiffs in the case.45 Thus, the district court
concluded that the statute unconstitutionally burdened the right to
use sexual devices within private adult, consensual sexual
relationships.46 It was after this opinion that Lawrence was decided.47
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals once again reversed the
district court, holding that there was no pre-existing, fundamental,
substantive-due-process right to sexual privacy triggering strict
scrutiny.48 Furthermore, the court held that Lawrence did not
recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy, and it refused to
create such a right.49 With strict scrutiny no longer available, the
court remanded again to the district court to examine whether
public morality remained a valid rational basis in light of Lawrence
overruling Bowers.50
On remand, the district court decided “not [to] invalidate the
Alabama law . . . simply because it [was] founded on concerns over
public morality.”51 Quoting Lawrence, the district court agreed that
eliminating public morality as a rational basis for legislation would
cause “a ‘massive disruption of the current social order,’ one this
court is not willing to set into motion.”52 The court concluded that
this case was distinguishable from Lawrence such that Lawrence did
not compel striking down the Alabama law.53

43. Williams v. Pryor (Williams III), 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1307 (N.D. Ala. 2002),
rev’d, 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
44. Id. at 1296.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
48. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir.
2004).
49. Id. at 1238.
50. Id. at 1238 n.9.
51. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2006),
aff’d, 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007).
52. Id. at 1249–50 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 591 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
53. Id. at 1253.
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By the third time the controversy reached the circuit court, the
only question remaining was “whether public morality remain[ed] a
sufficient rational basis for the challenged statute after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas.”54 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the holding of the district court that the statute survived
rational basis scrutiny because public morality remained a legitimate
governmental interest, even in light of the majority’s language in
Lawrence.55
The court began its analysis by determining that the statute in
question was subject to rational basis review. In Williams IV, the
court held that the Supreme Court had “declined the invitation” to
recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy, even though it had
numerous opportunities to do so.56 Thus, strict scrutiny was not
available and the law would be upheld if it “[bore] a rational relation
to some legitimate end.”57 The court emphasized the fact that a
statute is constitutional under rational basis scrutiny so long as
“‘there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the [statute].’”58 Thus, under rational basis review
a statute bears “a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking
the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to
negative every conceivable basis which might support it. . . . [I]t is
entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the
legislature.”59
Citing numerous Supreme Court decisions, the court reiterated
that “[t]he crafting and safeguarding of public morality has long
been an established part of the States’ plenary police power to
legislate and indisputably is a legitimate government interest under
rational basis scrutiny.”60 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument

54. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted).
55. Id.
56. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir.
2004).
57. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1320.
58. Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
59. Id. at 1320–21 (quoting FCC, 508 U.S. at 314–15).
60. Id. at 1321 (quoting Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61
(1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957))).
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that Lawrence ended all morals legislation, arguing that “while the
statute at issue in Lawrence criminalized private sexual conduct,” the
Alabama statute forbade “public, commercial activity.”61 The court
limited the language in Lawrence to only certain cases: “To the
extent Lawrence rejects public morality as a legitimate government
interest, it invalidates only those laws that target conduct that is both
private and non-commercial.”62 The court emphasized the public
and commercial element of the activity criminalized by the Alabama
statute, arguing bluntly, “There is nothing ‘private’ or ‘consensual’
about the advertising and sale of a dildo.”63
B. Texas and Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle
In 2008, the Fifth Circuit decided a separate case involving a
similar statute. Fortunately, the history behind this case is
significantly less complex. In 1979, the Texas legislature amended its
obscenity statute to prohibit the “promotion” of “obscene devices,”
which included selling, giving, lending, distributing, or advertising
for them.64 Thus, the Texas statute was broader than the Alabama
statute because even lending or gratuitously giving an obscene device
was criminal. Like the Alabama statute, however, the Texas statute
did not criminalize the use or possession of such a device.65 Similar
to the Alabama statute at issue in William VI, “obscene device” was
defined as any device “designed or marketed as useful primarily for
the stimulation of human genital organs.”66 A number of years later,
the legislature carved out an exception for individuals who promoted
obscene devices for “a bona fide medical, psychiatric, judicial,
legislative, or law enforcement purpose.”67
Two plaintiffs who engaged in the retail distribution of sexual
devices filed a declaratory action to enjoin the enforcement of the
statute, alleging that it violated “the substantive liberty rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the commercial speech

61. Id. at 1322.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1238
n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)).
64. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 2008).
65. Id. at 741.
66. Id. at 740–41 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(7) (Vernon 1979)).
67. Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.23(g) (Vernon 1993)).
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rights protected by the First Amendment.”68 The district court
dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the Constitution did not
protect the right to publicly promote sexual devices. The case was
appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.69
The circuit court addressed the due process argument first,
concluding that the asserted governmental interests did not meet the
constitutional standard announced in Lawrence for laws affecting the
right to engage in private intimate conduct in the home without
government intrusion.70 First, the court reasoned that “restricting
the ability to purchase an item is tantamount to restricting that
item’s use.”71 Furthermore, the fact that it was even illegal to lend or
give a sexual device to another person undercut the argument that
the statute only affected public conduct.72 Instead, this statute
unconstitutionally restricted “the exercise of the constitutional right
to engage in private intimate conduct in the home free from
government intrusion.”73
In interpreting the Lawrence decision, the court refused to
address whether the right at issue merited strict or rational basis
scrutiny.74 Instead, it opined that it was only necessary to apply the
Lawrence decision directly to this statute without trying to read
anything more into it, and, based on the holding in Lawrence, this
statute was unconstitutional as well.75 The court concluded, “Thus, if
in Lawrence public morality was an insufficient justification for a law
that restricted ‘adult consensual intimacy in the home,’ then public
morality also cannot serve as a rational basis for Texas’s statute,
which also regulates private sexual intimacy.”76 Because the statute
had already been held unconstitutional, the court did not sufficiently
analyze the First Amendment claims.77 The State petitioned for a
rehearing en banc but was denied.78
68. Id. at 742.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 743.
71. Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 683–91 (1977)).
72. Id. at 744.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 744–45.
76. Id. at 745.
77. Id. at 747.
78. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008) (denying
rehearing en banc).
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEX TOY STATUTES
The differences in the reasoning between the Williams VI court
and the Reliable Consultants court demonstrate the ambiguity of the
Lawrence decision and how reasonable minds can differ on the
subject of public morality in laws. After Lawrence, a number of
commentators attempted to dispel Justice Scalia’s fears that the
majority’s holding would be the end of morals legislation, including
government police power over polygamy, adult incest, bestiality, and
the like.79 Most commentators argued that the government would be
able to continue regulating such behavior because doing so was
justified on grounds other than public morality.80 This Comment
attempts to do the opposite, arguing instead that there remain a
number of areas of law justified only on public morality grounds, and
the majority in Lawrence had no intention of ending government
regulation in every moral realm. Instead, even the Lawrence majority
would have a difficult time extending its holding, as was done in
Reliable Consultants, to eliminate laws such as those prohibiting the
sale of sex toys.
This Comment will build on the Williams VI decision and give
the full analysis of why laws banning the sale of sex toys—passed
solely on grounds of public morality—are constitutional. This
analysis begins with a determination of the level of scrutiny that must
be afforded the statute. Because the right to sexual privacy has not
been established as a fundamental right, the law is only due rational
basis scrutiny.81 As such, the analysis turns to whether public
morality alone is a sufficient rational basis on which to enact the law.
In concluding that bare public morality here satisfies the rational
basis test, the discussion will look at both the history of morals

79. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 12; Nichols, supra note 12.
80. For example, one commentator argued that polygamy would still be illegal because
the government has an interest in promoting monogamous marriages (and also an interest in
protecting scarce government financial resources). Joseph Bozzuti, Note, The Constitutionality
of Polygamy Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATH.
LAW. 409, 433–41 (2004). Incest would still be illegal because the government has a
legitimate interest in preventing conception in a manner that increases the risk of the birth of
children with handicaps. See Philip G. Peters, Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State
Regulation of Reproductive Liberty, in HARMING FUTURE PERSONS: ETHICS, GENETICS AND
THE NONIDENTITY PROBLEM 317, 329 (Melinda A. Roberts & David T. Wasserman eds.,
2009).
81. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,
319–20 (1993)).
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legislation, including the Supreme Court’s past acceptance of morals
laws, and the differences between the laws at issue in Lawrence and
the laws under scrutiny here.
A. Level of Scrutiny for the Right to Sexual Privacy at Issue
In determining the constitutionality of these statutes, the first—
and perhaps most important—determination is the level of scrutiny
to be applied. Although many commentators have argued that
Lawrence established a fundamental right to sexual privacy,82 the
Eleventh Circuit was correct in concluding that the holding of
Lawrence was more limited and, as such, sex toy laws are only due
rational basis scrutiny.83 The Court in Lawrence failed to definitively
establish a fundamental right to sexual privacy through a Glucksberg
analysis.84 Furthermore, the Court has never held that sexual privacy
in itself is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny. Instead,
when establishing fundamental rights related to children and
procreation, the Court has defined such rights too narrowly to
encompass the kinds of statutes at issue here. Thus, only the rational
basis test should be applied to the sex toy laws at issue.
1. The absence of a Glucksberg analysis in Lawrence
It is established Supreme Court due process jurisprudence that a
Glucksberg analysis is the proper method for determining whether a
right is fundamental.85 The Glucksberg analysis comes from the
Supreme Court case of Washington v. Glucksberg, in which the Court
unanimously held that a right to assistance in committing suicide was
not protected by the Due Process Clause.86 The Court’s reasoning
focused on the fact that a right to assisted suicide was not a
fundamental liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
thus was only due rational basis scrutiny.87 Because the legislature

82. For a description of some of the arguments made in favor of Lawrence establishing a
fundamental right to sexual privacy, see Daniel Allender, Note, Applying Lawrence: Teenagers
and the Crime Against Nature, 58 DUKE L.J. 1825 (2009).
83. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2007).
84. See id. at 1319.
85. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
86. Id. at 728.
87. Id.
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had a legitimate interest in enacting the law—the preservation of
human life—the law was held to be constitutional.88
Glucksberg reiterated the established two-part analysis to
determine whether a liberty interest was “fundamental.” First, a
court must carefully formulate the interest at stake.89 Second, the
court must determine whether that interest is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history.”90 Only those interests deeply rooted in the
nation’s history are fundamental rights deserving of strict scrutiny.91
All other rights warrant only rational basis review.92
As pointed out by Justice Scalia in his dissent, the Lawrence
majority did not carefully formulate the interest at stake nor did it
correctly analyze the nation’s history to determine whether the right
was deeply rooted.93 The Court did look at the history of antisodomy laws, but there was no mention whatsoever of whether the
right to engage in sodomy was deeply rooted in this nation’s
history.94 The Court simply stated that the state had no legitimate
interest in enacting the anti-sodomy law, and thus it was
unconstitutional. According to Justice Scalia and many
commentators, these statements implicitly admit that the right was
only due rational basis scrutiny.95
This confusion of the issues by the Lawrence Court has led other
courts to conclude that where the right to sexual privacy is at issue,
no Glucksberg-type analysis is needed.96 For example, in Reliable
Consultants,
while
addressing
the
classification—whether
fundamental or not—of the right to sexual privacy, the court
reasoned, “The Supreme Court did not address the classification, nor
do we need to do so . . . .”97 The implication of this statement was
that the court did not apply either strict scrutiny or rational basis
scrutiny to the right at issue. The Reliable Consultants court erred in

88. Id. at 728 & n.20.
89. Id. at 722.
90. Id. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
91. Id. at 767 n.9 (Souter, J., concurring); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 766–67.
93. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008).
97. Id.
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holding that it was unnecessary to determine which level of scrutiny
the right to sexual privacy should be granted.
This was never the holding of Lawrence. Lawrence did not
explicitly overrule any case besides Bowers.98 To hold that a
Glucksberg-type analysis is no longer needed to establish a
fundamental right for substantive due process jurisprudence would
be to overstate and misinterpret Lawrence. Additionally, the
conclusion that Lawrence overruled any aspect of Glucksberg by
implication goes against the Court’s instructions. The Supreme
Court has instructed lower courts to not conclude that a more recent
case impliedly overrules earlier precedents.99 Thus, the court in
Reliable Consultants erred in concluding that a Glucksberg-type
analysis was no longer needed for determining the specific level of
scrutiny due laws implicating sexual privacy. And, as will be seen
below, the court in Williams VI was correct in treating the right to
sexual privacy as only a rational basis right.
2. The right to sexual privacy is only a rational basis right
A proper analysis of the right to sexual privacy at issue in Reliable
Consultants and Williams VI dictates that it be treated only as a
rational basis right for two reasons. First, to treat it as a fundamental
right would be to ignore the Court’s reluctance to create a broad
fundamental right to sexual privacy.100 To the extent that Lawrence
may have created a right to sexual privacy, it was limited to the
specific right at issue in the case—that is, to engage in sexual activity
with someone of the same sex. Second, the Court properly exercised
its discretion in Lawrence by not explicitly creating a broad right to
sexual privacy.
Only a limited number of “fundamental rights” exist for
purposes of substantive due process analysis.101 Those rights are
limited to personal decisions relating to “marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”102
None of those rights specifically includes the rights at issue in
Reliable Consultants and the Williams cases. In fact, the Court has

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).
See Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 745 n.32.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
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never determined that a broad “right to sexual privacy” is a
fundamental right for substantive due process analysis.
The Court has had numerous opportunities to create such a
fundamental right, but each time has decided to define the right
more narrowly so as to not encompass all sexual activity.103 For
example, in Carey v. Population Services, the Court was presented
with the question of the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to anyone under the age of sixteen by
anyone other than a licensed pharmacist.104 In holding that the
statute was unconstitutional, the Court recognized a right to privacy
that extended to an individual’s liberty to make choices regarding
contraception.105 Thus, where the court could have established a
right to privacy that extended to all decisions relating to sex, it
instead limited that right to decisions related to contraception.106
Most importantly, the Court explicitly stated:
Contrary to the suggestion advanced in Mr. JUSTICE POWELL’s
opinion, we do not hold that state regulation must meet this
standard “whenever it implicates sexual freedom,” or “affect[s]
adult sexual relations,” but only when it “burden[s] an individual’s
right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by
substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that
decision.”107

Similarly, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird narrowly defined a
fundamental right to decide “whether to bear or beget a child”
where it could have instead created a broad right to sexual privacy.108
The Court had another opportunity in Lawrence, as it did in
Carey and Eisenstadt, to create a broad right to sexual privacy.109 The
Court, though, once again limited the scope of the right in question.
As mentioned above, it is debatable whether or not the Court in
103. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 361 (5th Cir. 2008) (denying
rehearing en banc) (citing Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232,
1235 (11th Cir. 2004)).
104. Carey, 431 U.S. at 681.
105. Id. at 685–86.
106. Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1235–36.
107. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5 (citations omitted). The Court had previously addressed
the Constitutionality of a statute completely banning the use of contraceptives. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Instead of recognizing a broad right to sexual privacy, the
Court emphasized “notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” Id. at 486.
108. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
109. See Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1235–36.
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Lawrence treated the right at issue as a fundamental right.110 This
Comment argued above that the failure of the Court to do a proper
“fundamental right” analysis foreclosed the idea that the right in
question was a fundamental right. But let us assume for a moment
that Lawrence did intend to create a fundamental right. What is the
scope of that right?
The language of Lawrence itself limits any right recognized by
the Court to the facts of the case and Texas statute at issue. “The
question before the Court [was] the validity of a Texas statute
making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in
certain intimate sexual conduct.”111 In determining that the statute
was unconstitutional, the Court remarked that its decision was based
on the fact that the petitioners’ “right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government.”112 Thus, in coming to its
conclusion, the Court in Lawrence emphasized that, although the
case dealt with what kinds of private activities individuals could
engage in, the decision hinged on the fact that the statute dealt with
whom you could engage in such activities. Thus, any fundamental
right announced by the court is not a freestanding right to sexual
privacy, but instead the right to choose with whom you want to be
intimate.113
Those commentators who view Lawrence as establishing a
fundamental right tend to agree with this narrow view of the
fundamental right. For example, Harvard constitutional law
professor Laurence Tribe articulated the liberty interest in Lawrence
as the right to be free from the state “stigmatiz[ing] . . . intimate
personal relationships between people of the same sex.”114 Other

110. See supra Part IV.A.1.
111. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
112. Id. at 578.
113. This formulation of the right comports with the holding in Griswold v. Connecticut.
381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court emphasizes that it is the relationship, more than
the action, that receives constitutional protection. For example, the Court states, “The present
case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which . . . seeks to achieve its
goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. . . . The very idea
is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” Id. at 485–86
(emphasis added).
114. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1904 (2004).
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commentators have come to the same conclusion.115 Thus, even if
Lawrence created a fundamental right, it would not cover sex toy
laws because such laws do not specifically target “intimate personal
relationships between people of the same sex.”116
Furthermore, the Court itself has recognized its responsibility to
practice restraint in substantive due process analysis. In Glucksberg,
the Court counseled, “We must therefore ‘exercise the utmost care
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,’ lest the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed
into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.”117 The
Court also recognized its longstanding reluctance “to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and
open-ended.”118 Accordingly, the Court in interpreting its own
decision in Lawrence will be hesitant to recognize a broad
fundamental right to sexual privacy because doing so might
unnecessarily replace the views of legislatures with the “policy
preferences of the Members of [the] Court.”119
Thus, because the right to sexual privacy has never been held to
be a broad fundamental right, the statute at issue in Reliable
Consultants and the Williams cases are only due rational basis
scrutiny.
B. Public Morality as a Rational Basis
Having determined that sex toy statutes are to be given rational
basis scrutiny because they do not implicate any fundamental rights,
the question turns to whether such statutes are rationally related to
any legitimate governmental interest.120 The only governmental
interest asserted by states such as Alabama and Texas in enacting
these laws is public morality.121 There is no dispute that if public
morality were a legitimate governmental interest then it would be

115. See Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J.
1862, 1868–75 (2006).
116. Tribe, supra note 114, at 1904.
117. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1997)).
120. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
121. Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1286 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
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rationally related to a prohibition on the sale of sex toys. The
question becomes, then, whether bare public morality is still a
legitimate governmental interest. If public morality is a legitimate
governmental interest then the laws are constitutional. This
Comment argues that the laws are constitutional for two reasons.
First, history is replete with examples of the Court upholding the
ability of legislatures to legislate morals. Second, the sale of sex toys
is a public activity as opposed to the private interactions between
individuals at issue in Lawrence.122
1. History of morals legislation
The Reliable Consultant court’s decision to read Lawrence as
eliminating public morality as a rational basis completely contradicts
hundreds of years of Supreme Court jurisprudence explicitly
upholding such as a rational basis. As Justice Scalia mentioned in his
concurrence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
there is no basis for thinking that our society has ever shared that
Thoreauvian “you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-notinjure-someone-else” beau ideal—much less for thinking it was
written into the Constitution. . . . Our society prohibits, and all
human societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they
harm others but because they are considered, in the traditional
phrase, “contra bonos mores,” i.e., immoral. . . . While there may be
great diversity of view on whether various of these prohibitions
should exist . . . , there is no doubt that, absent specific
constitutional protection for the conduct involved, the
Constitution does not prohibit them simply because they regulate
“morality.”123

There is a long history of the Court explicitly mentioning morals as a
legitimate basis upon which a legislature can enact laws, and this line
of cases remains good law even in light of Lawrence.

122. To the extent that some statutes, including that at issue in Texas, forbid even the
lending or gratuitously giving of obscene devices, this second argument breaks down. See
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008). Thus, this Comment
does not argue that this specific provision is constitutional. Nevertheless, the court in Reliable
Consultants focused very little on the lending of obscene devices, and thus when this
Comment addresses the “Texas statute” it is referencing the provisions banning the sale of
obscene devices.
123. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 574–75 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The power to legislate in the moral realm has traditionally been
regarded as part of the state’s police power.124 In 1923, the Supreme
Court, in the well-known case Meyer v. Nebraska, recognized the
duty of the government to promote morality: “That the state may do
much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally and morally is clear; but the individual
has certain fundamental rights which must be respected.”125 Thus, as
of early twentieth century, morals legislation was an acceptable
practice. The Court did recognize, however, that morals legislation
can extend only as far as it does not infringe on a fundamental right
of the citizens.126 As the right at issue here is not a fundamental
right, sex toy statutes would have clearly been constitutional over
100 years ago.
The Court continued to support the idea of morals legislation for
most of the century. In Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, the Court
stated:
The police power may be exerted in the form of state legislation
where otherwise the effect may be to invade rights guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment only when such legislation bears a real
and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some
other phase of the general welfare.127

A quarter of a century later the Court echoed its previous
acceptance of morals legislation. “Public safety, public health,
morality, peace and quiet, law and order—these are some of the
more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the
police power to municipal affairs.”128
In the latter part of the century some specific examples of morals
legislation came before the Court. Surprisingly, the Court upheld the
laws even though they were based substantially on a view of morality
and impacted conduct by consenting adults. In Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton the Court was presented with the question of whether
Georgia could regulate the display of obscene materials in a private,

124. In 1885, the Court in Barbier v. Connolly mentioned that a state can make
regulations “to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people.”
113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884).
125. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111–12 (1928) (emphasis added).
128. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (emphasis added).
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adult theater.129 There was no question that it was proper exercise of
the police power to prohibit the display of these kinds of films to
minors.130 However, the Court came to the surprising conclusion
that “the States have a legitimate interest in regulating commerce in
obscene material and in regulating exhibition of obscene material in
places of public accommodation, including so-called ‘adult’ theaters
from which minors are excluded.”131 The Court emphasized the fact
that conduct involving consenting adults is not always beyond state
regulation, reasoning that a morals law cannot go solely to what
society considers “wrong” or “sinful” but suggesting instead that it
must promote the state’s right to “maintain a decent society.”132
Thus, Paris Adult Theatre upheld morals legislation, even where it
impacts the activities of private, consenting adults, but only so long
as the conduct impacted has a public or commercial element.133
The Court faced a similar law in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.134 In
Barnes, the Court addressed a public indecency statute that required
dancers at adult entertainment establishments to wear pasties and a
G-string.135 The statute at issue was a morals law in that it merely
“reflect[ed] moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude
among strangers in public places.”136 Nevertheless, a plurality of the
Court found the statute “clearly within the constitutional power of
the State,” reasoning that it furthered a substantial government
interest in protecting order and morality.137
Thus, the Court, in Paris Adult Theatre and Barnes, has, within
the last twenty-five years, upheld legislation passed to protect only
the “morality” and order of society. The Court has put limits on this
kind of legislation—including the requirement that there be some
“public” aspect of the conduct and that the legislation not violate a
fundamental right of citizens—but these cases upheld morals
legislation similar to that struck down in Lawrence. Interestingly,

129. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 50–51 (1973).
130. Id. at 53.
131. Id. at 69.
132. Id. (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting)).
133. Id.
134. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
135. Id. at 572.
136. Id. at 568.
137. Id. at 567.
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although Lawrence expressed displeasure with morals legislation,
neither Paris Adult Theatre nor Barnes was overruled by the Court.
This strong history of acceptance of morals legislation provides
the strongest support of the constitutionality of sex toy statutes. Like
the obscene material statute in Paris Adult Theatre, the sex toy
statutes at issue here regulate conduct by consenting adults. But, also
like the obscene material statute, sex toy statutes have a “public”
aspect. In fact, the private use of sex toys is not prohibited.138
Instead, most statutes only prohibit the sale of these kinds of items at
public stores—akin to the prohibition of obscene films at public
theaters. The state has a legitimate interest in maintaining a “decent
society,”139 and regulating the commercial sale of sex toys—like
regulating the display of obscene films—is rationally related to that
interest.
Thus, because promotion of order and morality remains a
legitimate government interest—especially where some sort of public
activity is involved—and sex toy laws involve public, commercial
activity and do not implicate a fundamental right, such laws are
constitutional.
2. Distinguishing Lawrence
The court in Reliable Consultants did not find sex toy statutes
analogous to the kinds of statutes at issue in Paris Adult Theatre and
Barnes. Instead, because sexual activity is implicated by sex toy
statutes, the court found Lawrence to be most analogous.140 Because
Lawrence explicitly stated that public morality was an insufficient
justification for the sodomy statute, public morality was also an
insufficient justification for a sex toy statute.141
This direct application of Justice Kennedy’s statement that
morals alone do not justify laws prohibiting certain practices,142
though, is an improper expansion of the Lawrence holding for two
reasons. First, the sex toy statutes have a commercial element that
was not present in Lawrence. Second, to expand the Lawrence
138. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir. 2008).
139. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (quoting Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
140. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744.
141. Id. at 745.
142. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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holding would be to diminish the importance of the Court’s holding
as it relates to homosexual conduct. Because Lawrence does not
apply directly to these statutes and because, as discussed above,
public morality can be a sufficient justification on which to enact a
law, Justice Scalia’s fear that we have seen “the end of all morals
legislation”143 was unfounded.
a. Commercial nature of the statute. In holding that states have a
legitimate interest in regulating the exhibition of obscene materials
in places of public accommodation, the Court in Paris Adult Theatre
emphasized the idea that morals legislation is more likely to be
upheld where public activity is involved.144 The court in Reliable
Consultants ignored this concept and instead decided that, because
sexual activity was implicated by the statute at issue, Lawrence was
the most appropriate case to apply.145 Although the statute
prohibited only the sale of sex toys, the court concluded that “[a]n
individual who wants to legally use a safe sexual device during private
intimate moments alone or with another is unable to legally purchase
a device in Texas, which heavily burdens a constitutional right.”146
The court continued, “This conclusion is consistent with the
decisions in Carey and Griswold, where the Court held that
restricting commercial transactions unconstitutionally burdened the
exercise of individual rights.”147
In short, the argument is that although the statute at issue
prohibited only public, commercial conduct—the sale of obscene
devices—because the restriction on the sale of these devices strongly
burdens their use, the statute implicates protected private activity
and not just commercial activity. The court cited Carey v. Population
Services and Griswold v. Connecticut to support its point.148 Although
the Reliable Consultants court might be correct that the statute
would be unconstitutional in light of Lawrence if it did in fact
impermissibly burden private sexual activity, the court was incorrect
in concluding that Carey and Griswold applied here. Because the
statute in this case impacts only public, commercial activity, this case
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id. at 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69.
See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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is distinguishable from those Supreme Court precedents and is
constitutional.
In Carey, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a New York
law that, among other things, prohibited distribution of
contraceptives to anyone over sixteen by anyone other than a
licensed pharmacist.149 The Court struck down the statute as
impermissibly burdening “the right of the individual to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.”150 The Court reasoned that “[r]estrictions on
the distribution of contraceptives clearly burden the freedom to
make such decisions.”151 Thus, Carey stands for the proposition that,
where a law restricts commercial transactions related to an individual
right, the law must be analyzed as though it directly impacts that
right.152
The issues in Reliable Consultants and the Williams cases are
distinguishable from those in Carey, though. The right at issue in
Carey related to a fundamental right to not have unwarranted
governmental intrusion in the decision whether or not to have a
child. The Court in Carey, in making its decision, cited to Griswold
v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade and its progeny.153 Like Carey, those
cases dealt with fundamental rights—the right to be free from
governmental intrusion in the decision whether to conceive a child
and in a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.154
The right implicated by sex toy laws—a right to broad sexual
freedom—is not a fundamental right in the mold of those at issue in
Carey, Griswold and Roe.155 In fact, the Court in Carey explicitly
mentioned that its holding did not apply to state regulation
whenever it implicated sexual freedom: “[W]e do not hold that state
regulation must meet this standard ‘whenever it implicates sexual
freedom,’ or ‘affect[s] adult sexual relations,’ but only when it
‘burden[s] an individual’s right to decide to prevent conception or

149. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977) (quoting Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
150. Id. at 687 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See supra Part IV.A.
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terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of
effectuating that decision.”156
Furthermore, the policy considerations at issue in Carey are not
present here. In making its decision, the Court in Carey emphasized
the fact that the statute in issue restricted the number of
“distribution channels to a small fraction of the total number of
possible retail outlets, reduce[d] the opportunity for privacy of
selection and purchase, and lessen[ed] the possibility of price
competition.”157 The sex toy laws at issue in Reliable Consultants and
Williams do not produce the outcomes listed in Carey. These laws
do not prohibit the purchase of obscene devices online, which are
surely for sale in other states. Surely only a small number of physical
stores sell these obscene devices as compared to the number of
online retailers. Thus, eliminating the physical stores does not reduce
the distribution channels to a small fraction of the total number of
possible retail outlets. In fact, it is not unreasonable to assume that
many individuals would prefer to purchase these kinds of devices
online regardless of whether or not they are also available in local
retail stores. Online retail, as opposed to public purchases, also
promotes privacy in selection and purchase. Last, with the number of
overall online outlets, price competition is not an issue. Thus,
applying Carey to the facts of Reliable Consultants and Williams VI
so as to analyze those cases as directly infringing the right to sexual
privacy would be to impermissibly extend its holding.
Because these statutes must be analyzed under a state’s power to
regulate commercial activity, the right at issue in this case is not the
same right to sexual privacy at issue in Lawrence. Lawrence
specifically excluded public actions from its holding that public
morality is an insufficient basis on which to enact laws.158
Particularly, the Court said,
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether

156. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5.
157. Id. at 689.
158. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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the government must give formal recognition to any relationship
that homosexual persons seek to enter.159

The public sale of obscene devices surely constitutes “public
conduct” not covered by Lawrence as described by the Court.160
Instead, the law at issue, as discussed previously,161 is more similar to
the law at issue in Paris Adult Theatre, which was upheld because
the state had a legitimate interest in regulating commerce as it
related to obscene materials.162 In that case, public morality—as it
related to the state’s promotion of decency—was held to be a
legitimate government interest.163 Likewise, the statute here can be
upheld because the state has a legitimate interest in promoting
decency by forbidding the public sale of sex toys. The Lawrence
holding, relating to purely private conduct, cannot be applied
directly, as it was done in Reliable Consultants, to conclude that the
statute was unconstitutional. “There is nothing ‘private’ or
‘consensual’ about the advertising and sale of a dildo.”164
b. Importance of the homosexual element in Lawrence. To extend
Lawrence to cover the sex toy laws at issue would be to both ignore
the reasons it was decided and to diminish its importance and
significance to gay rights. Part of the difficulty in applying Lawrence
to laws banning the sale of sex toys is that Lawrence left a number of
questions unanswered. Courts, including the Reliable Consultants
court, have misinterpreted the Lawrence holding in a number of
areas, the most relevant of which is the extent of the right in
question.
The question addressed by the Court in Lawrence was “the
validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the
same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.”165 Although
the Court in some instances mentions a broad right to sexual privacy,
in most instances it frames the right in terms of not what you can do
but with whom you can do it. Thus, there is a strong argument that
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See supra Part IV.B.1.
162. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973).
163. Id.
164. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1237 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)).
165. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
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Lawrence only established a right to engage in sexual activity with
someone of the same sex without unnecessary governmental
intrusion. Therefore, Lawrence does not apply to the sex toy statutes
because those statutes do not implicate the right to engage in sexual
activity with someone of the same sex.
No fewer than ten times does the Court in Lawrence frame the
issue as the right for two people of the same sex to engage in sexual
activity—and not as a broader freedom of sexual intimacy. For
example, the Court, in describing the statutes at issue, stated: “The
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”166 The
Court went on to argue: “When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to
make this choice.”167 At this point, the Court made no mention of a
broader right to sexual freedom to engage in any activity without
governmental intrusion—only the freedom to choose a sexual
partner of the same sex.
In fact, the majority of the Court’s historical analysis focused
directly on laws limiting the sexual freedoms of homosexuals.168 For
example, in concluding its discussion of society’s historical and
traditional rejection of homosexual practices on moral and religious
grounds, the Court stated, “The issue is whether the majority may
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole
society through operation of the criminal law.”169
It would be strange if the Court were to announce a broad right
to sexual freedom without governmental intrusion and without
analyzing the history behind that freedom. The Court itself
recognized, “History and tradition are the starting point . . . of the
substantive due process inquiry.”170 Based on the Court’s own
analysis, without ever touching on the history and tradition of a
broad right to sexual freedom, the Court did not make a sufficient
166. Id. at 567.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. See id. at 568–71.
169. Id. at 571.
170. Id. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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due process inquiry to announce such a right—one that would cover
the sex toy laws at issue.
The Court’s ultimate conclusion rested on its rejection of Bowers
and how the Bowers decision particularly impacted homosexuals:
“Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers
would deny them this right.”171 It went on, “The central holding of
Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it should be
addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of
homosexual persons.”172 Thus, the primary purpose in the Court
overruling Bowers was to promote the rights and autonomy of
homosexual persons. There was hardly a mention in the opinion of a
right to sexual freedom that extends beyond this holding. The Court
does conclude with the statement, “The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.”173 This statement alone,
however, is insufficient to create a broad right of sexual freedom for
all individuals in all instances.
The kind of analysis used in the Lawrence opinion is not
uncommon. William N. Eskridge, Jr., a Yale Law School professor
and co-author of the Cato Institute’s amicus brief in Lawrence,174
argues:
The key to understanding Lawrence—and all its doctrinal
complexities—is the Supreme Court’s recognition that American
democratic pluralism must meet the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgendered (LGBT) rights movement at least halfway. After a
century of discrimination and persecution, lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals have demonstrated through their lives that traditional
state antigay discrimination and persecution were unjust. . . . But
contrary to the dissenters, Lawrence only sets a new floor for gay
people, and not the same floor that straight Americans can take for

171. Id. at 574.
172. Id. at 575.
173. Id. at 578.
174. William N. Eskridge – Profile, Jr., http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/WEskridge.
htm. The Court relied on scholarly articles and the amicus brief written by Professor Eskridge
in making its decision in ruling in favor of the petitioners in Lawrence. See Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 567–68, 571–72.
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granted. Lawrence gives us nothing less than, but also nothing
more than, a jurisprudence of tolerance.175

Under this reasoning, to argue that Lawrence came out the way
it did because all people have a broad right to sexual freedom may
diminish the meaning of Lawrence to the LGBT community and
remand homosexuals back to a position of discrimination and
persecution.
Thus, because the freedom announced in Lawrence was
specific—the freedom to engage in sexual activity with someone of
the same sex—to apply it directly to the facts of Reliable Consultants
or Williams VI would be improper. Those cases involve not the right
to engage in a relationship with someone of the same sex, but
instead simply the right to purchase obscene items that could
potentially be used in such a relationship. The Reliable Consultants
court, therefore, erred in holding the statute unconstitutional in
light of Lawrence.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to address Justice Kennedy’s
statement in Lawrence that public morality is never a legitimate
government interest so as to satisfy rational basis scrutiny. A circuit
split has emerged in an effort to interpret this statement in the realm
of the sale of obscene adult items like sex toys. Although the Court
may adopt Justice Kennedy’s position that public morality is
insufficient to allow a legislature to control what goes on in the
private bedroom, the holding of Lawrence only goes that far. This
Comment argues that, where the conduct prohibited is not purely
private, but has a commercial element, and where the rights
implicated are not fundamental rights, public morality remains a
legitimate government interest that satisfied rational basis scrutiny.
To extend the Lawrence holding to apply to a legislature
criminalizing only the sale of adult items, as was done in Reliable
Consultants, would be impermissible for a number of reasons. First,
only rational basis scrutiny applies and not any sort of strict scrutiny.
As such, there is a lower threshold of constitutionality for these kinds
of laws. Second, history has established morality as a legitimate
government interest in many cases. These cases have never been
175. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2004).
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overruled and remain good law, even in light of the Lawrence
decision. Next, the right at issue here involves public, commercial
activity, which was explicitly disclaimed in Lawrence. The Court’s
holding in Carey is distinguishable, and thus the laws should be
analyzed as infringing only the right to sell obscene items and not
the more broad right to sexual freedom. Last, the Lawrence decision
was heavily influenced by the fact that gay rights were involved—and
such rights were not at issue in either Williams VI or Reliable
Consultants.
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